

1 **Criticality in the COVID-19 pandemic: an introduction to the SIR** 2 **(susceptible-infected-recovered) model of disease spread**

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9 10 **Summary**

11 Mathematical modeling can help us to understand epidemic illnesses like COVID-
12 19/SARS-CoV-2 and to see how various interventions might affect their course.
13 Here we work through the so-called SIR model (for susceptible-infected-recovered)
14 for COVID-19. One key property of the model is that there is a critical value for R_0
15 (the number of secondary infections per primary infection), above which the
16 disease is expected to ultimately affect much or most of the population, and below
17 which the disease will be extinguished. This underscores the importance of social
18 distancing, which can decrease the number of secondary infections, in the battle
19 against this potentially catastrophic scourge.

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21
22 The now-standard mathematical model for the time-evolution of an infection, the
23 SIR model, was developed in the 1920's by the Scottish epidemiologists Anderson
24 Gray McKendrick and William Ogilvy Kermack (1). In its simplest form, the model
25 divvies up the population (of a city, a county, a country, or the earth) into three
26 compartments or pools (Figure 1). Those who are susceptible to the disease are
27 said to be in the S pool, and in our case that is initially everyone, since for a new
28 disease like COVID-19 the expectation is that none of us are immune. Those who
29 have caught the virus and are infectious are in the I pool. And those who had
30 caught the virus but are no longer infectious, either because they have recovered to
31 health or have died, are in the R pool. The conversions from one pool to another
32 are assumed to be one-way processes.

33
34 With these assumptions stated, we can write equations for the rates of infection
35 and recovery. We assume that the rate of infection is directly proportional to the
36 fraction of the population that is susceptible (S) and the fraction that is contagious
37 (I):

$$38 \text{rate of infection} = k_1 S \cdot I . \quad \text{Eq. 1}$$

39
40

41 Note that there is positive feedback built into this expression: the rate of infection
 42 goes up as the fraction of the population that is infected (and infectious) goes up.

43

44 The rate of recovery is proportional to I :

45

$$46 \quad \text{rate of recovery} = k_2 I . \quad \text{Eq. 2}$$

47

48 We can then combine Eqs 1 and 2 to yield ordinary differential equations (rate
 49 equations) for the net rate of change of each of the three time-dependent species
 50 (S , I , and R):

51

$$52 \quad \frac{dS}{dt} = -k_1 S \cdot I \quad \text{Eq. 3}$$

$$53 \quad \frac{dI}{dt} = k_1 S \cdot I - k_2 I \quad \text{Eq. 4}$$

$$54 \quad \frac{dR}{dt} = k_2 I . \quad \text{Eq. 5}$$

55

56 There are only two adjustable parameters in these equations, the two
 57 proportionality constants: k_1 , which is a measure of the rate of infection, and k_2 ,
 58 which determines the rate of recovery. The ratio of k_1 to k_2 tells us how effective
 59 the virus is in the face of host and societal defenses, and it is traditionally termed
 60 R_0 (R naught). R_0 specifies how many secondary infections, on average, are going
 61 to be produced from each primary infection; it can be viewed as the basic
 62 reproduction number for the virus. For COVID-19, R_0 is estimated to be 2 to 3 (2);
 63 for comparison, $R_0 \approx 1.3$ for influenza, a less highly contagious disease.

64

65 The easiest way to get a feel for the behavior of the model is to solve the rate
 66 equations numerically for various choices of the parameters, and graph the
 67 calculated time courses. This is shown in Figure 2. We started the simulation with
 68 $I[0] = 1/330,000,000$, which means that initially there is a single infected individual
 69 in a country with a population of 330 million (like the US).

70

71 From the linear plot in Figure 2A, it looks like S starts to drop and I and R start to
 72 increase at around 12 weeks after the initial infection. However, the semi-log plot
 73 (Figure 2B) shows that the number of infections actually increases right from the
 74 start, and that the increase is approximately exponential. From Eq. 4, it follows that
 75 the doubling time for the exponential increase is initially:

76

77
$$\tau = \frac{\text{Ln}[2]}{k_1 - k_2}.$$
 Eq. 6

78
79 For the values of k_1 and k_2 we chose here— $k_1 = 2.4$ infections per week, and $k_2 =$
80 1.2 recoveries per week, which corresponds to an optimistic $R_0 = 2$ —the calculated
81 doubling time turns out to be $0.693/1.2 = 0.58$ weeks or 4 days (3), which is the
82 current (as of March 17) doubling time for US deaths. In the US, documented cases
83 are doubling faster than this ($t \approx 2.5$ days), but that probably reflects an increase
84 in screening as well as the actual increase in cases.

85
86 The modeled number of infections is maximal at ~ 16 weeks and then begins to
87 drop approximately exponentially. If the first case of COVID-19 in the US began
88 sometime between February 1 and 15 2020, this would put the peak of cases at
89 some time between May 23 and June 6 2020, and the peak of deaths about two
90 weeks later. Again from Eq. 4, the half time for the exponential decrease is:

91
92
$$\tau = \frac{\text{Ln}[2]}{S_\infty k_1 - k_2},$$
 Eq. 7

93
94 where S_∞ denotes the fraction of the population that is still susceptible to infection
95 after the epidemic has run its course (calculated to be 0.20 for values of k_1 and k_2
96 assumed here).

97
98 At the peak of the modeled epidemic, about 15% of the population is infected, a
99 huge percentage. And by the end of the epidemic, 80% of the population will have
100 been infected, again a huge percentage (note that R , the fraction of the population
101 that has recovered, is the same as the fraction of the population that at some point
102 had been infected) (Figure 2). Assuming a case fatality rate of 1%, ultimately 0.8%
103 of the country's population—2,640,000 people out of 330,000,000—would die. This
104 would be an incredibly catastrophic scenario.

105
106 The peak number of infected individuals, and the ultimate number of individuals to
107 become infected, depend only upon R_0 , not the individual values of k_1 and k_2 . This
108 is one of the reasons epidemiologists care so much about what the value of R_0 is.

109
110 So what would be expected if a country instituted a social distancing policy that
111 reduced the number of secondary cases per primary case from its nominal value of
112 $R_0 \approx 2$ to something less? A relatively modest decrease in R_0 , from 2 to 1.5, would
113 "flatten the curve" (4), shifting the peak of infections from 16 weeks to 31 weeks
114 and decreasing the peak height from 15% to 6% (Figure 3). This would not only

115 buy the country some time, but also make it so that the worst days of the infection
116 were less likely to overwhelm the health care system, and therefore improve the
117 ultimate mortality rate.

118
119 Moreover, the proportion of the population that would ultimately be infected (and
120 hence the proportion that would ultimately die of the infection) would drop, from
121 80% to 58% (Figure 3). This is an improvement—58 million infections is certainly
122 better than 80 million—but this hypothetical scenario is still catastrophic; it would
123 result in hundreds of thousands of deaths.

124
125 But if R_0 can be lowered to 1 or less, something remarkable happens: the peak of
126 infected individuals vanishes, and the proportion of the population that will
127 ultimately become infected drops precipitously. The disease fizzles out instead of
128 growing exponentially. For $R_0 = 1$, our initial case would ultimately result in
129 $\sim 26,000$ cases—only 0.008% of the population (Figure 3). And if $R_0 = 0.5$, our
130 initial case would, on average, result in only a single additional case.

131
132 The relationship between the assumed value of R_0 and the cumulative number of
133 cases that would have occurred after an infinitely long time is plotted in Figure 4.
134 Below $R_0 = 1$, relatively few people get sick, and then once R_0 exceeds 1, the
135 number of cases begins to rise sharply. This behavior is really the essence of this
136 type of dynamical system. The positive feedback makes it so that the system has a
137 critical point (a transcritical bifurcation, in the lexicon of nonlinear dynamics) that
138 separates one type of dynamical behavior—the infection fizzles out—from a
139 qualitatively different type of behavior—the infection explodes. This change in
140 behavior is analogous to one type of phase transition seen in biology and physics,
141 which is sort of interesting, but the main thing is that it really matters which side of
142 the bifurcation we are on.

143
144 Of course this is all predicated on the assumption that the SIR model is actually
145 applicable to the COVID-19 pandemic. And, to be sure, some of the assumptions
146 built into the model are suspect. For example, the model assumes that the
147 population of the county, state, country, or whatever, is a well-mixed system,
148 where every person interacts with every other person on the time scale of the
149 epidemic. This is clearly not true—there is spatial structure to the evolving
150 epidemic. But the most basic lessons of the model, that the infectiousness of a
151 virus determines whether the infection will fizzle out or explode, and that the
152 infectiousness also determines the fraction of the population that will ultimately
153 become infected, probably are true.

154

155 So is there any reason to think that it might be possible to decrease COVID-19's R0
156 value below 1? The answer is yes, unquestionably, and the evidence comes from
157 the dynamics of the epidemic in China, the first country beset by COVID-19. China
158 is a country of 1.3 billion people, and a virus with $R_0 = 2$ should, in principle,
159 eventually infect 1 billion of them. With a case fatality rate of 1%, that would mean
160 10 million deaths. But the number of COVID-19 cases in China appears to be
161 leveling off at around 100,000 cases and 3200 deaths (3). Assuming these numbers
162 to be accurate, the actual number of cases is 10,000-fold lower than what the
163 model says should be expected, and possibly ~ 10 million lives have been saved.
164 This is almost certainly the result of the draconian measures taken by the
165 government to prevent person-to-person spread; they must have decreased R0 by
166 a lot, and consequently they have halted the epidemic. The situation in the Republic
167 of Korea is similar: in a country of 51 million people, the epidemic is leveling off at
168 less than 10,000 cases, not the 40,000,000 expected for a disease that is this
169 infectious.

170
171 And this is why it is a sign of great hope that around the world, countries, states,
172 businesses, and schools are implementing policies with a real likelihood of
173 substantially decreasing R0. Surely if those individuals known to be infected
174 (through diagnostic screening of people with COVID-19 symptoms and the contacts
175 of those known to be infected) were to be rigorously quarantined, and those who
176 might unknowingly be infected were to decrease their number of daily contacts by,
177 say, a factor of 5 or so, it should be possible to hugely mitigate the millenium's
178 worst global health crisis.

179

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186 **References**


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
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207 **Figure 1. The SIR model of infectious disease.** Individuals in the population get
208 transferred from susceptible (*S*) to infected (*I*) to recovered (*R*) pools through one-
209 way processes.

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
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215 **Figure 2. Simulated infection dynamics for the COVID-19 pandemic.** We
 216 have assumed an infection rate constant k_1 of 2.4 infections per week and a
 217 recovery rate constant k_2 of 1.2 per week, which means that R_0 , the basic
 218 reproduction number, is 2. We assumed that at time zero there was one infected
 219 individual in a population of 330,000,000.

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


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225 **Figure 3. Decreasing R_0 , for example through social distancing, both**
 226 **“flattens the curve” (top) and decreases the total number of infections**
 227 **(bottom).** Note that the fraction of the population that has recovered is the same
 228 as the fraction that has had the infection. We have assumed a country of
 229 330,000,000 people with a single individual infected at time zero, a recovery rate
 230 constant $k_2 = 1.2 \text{ week}^{-1}$, and values of k_1 to make $R_0 = 2, 1.5, \text{ or } 1$.

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Figure 4. Criticality in the relationship between the ultimate number of infected individuals and the assumed R_0 value. Decreasing R_0 through social distancing can change an epidemic into an infection that will fizzle out.